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NPS is the Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA — 1500 students 
• US Military & Civilian (Scholarship for Service & SMART) 
• Foreign Military (30 countries) 
!
Graduate Schools of  
Operational & Information Sciences (GSOIS) 
• Computer Science 
• Defense Analysis 
• Information Sciences 
• Operations Research 
• Cyber Academic Group 
!
National Capital Region (NCR) Office 
• 900 N Glebe (Ballston)/Virginia Tech building 
• Courses at Ft. Meade
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“Evaluation”  
• Trusted hardware and software 
• Cloud computing 
!
“Exploitation”  
• MEDEX — “Media” — Hard drives, camera cards, GPS devices. 
• CELEX — Cell phone 
• DOCEX — Documents 
• DOMEX — Document & Media Exploitation 
!
Current Partners: 
• Law Enforcement (FBI & Local) 
• DHS (HSARPA; Video Games & Insider Threat) 
• NSF (Courseware development) 
• DOD
Digital Evaluation and Exploitation (DEEP): 
Research in “trusted” systems and exploitation.
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Snapchat is a popular app!
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Snapchat promised users that expired images 
could not be viewed unless “saved.”
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Snapchat promised users that expired images 
could not be viewed unless “saved.”
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OMG! — Expired images not actually deleted. 
They were just hidden from view.
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5/10/13 Recover deleted Snapchats? Decipher Forensics finds sexting app's privacy problem.
www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/09/recover_deleted_snapchats_decipher_forensics_finds_sexting_app_s_privacy.html 1/2
By  Will  Oremus  |  Posted  Thursday,  May  9,  2013,  at  3:56  PM
Snapchat's  users  shouldn't  be  shocked  to  find  that
their  images  can  be  recovered  even  after  they  "self-­
destruct"—but  they  will  be  anyway.
Sylvie  Bouchard/Shutterstock.com
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OMG,  "Deleted"  Snapchat  Sexts  Can  Actually  Be
Recovered
The  premise  of  Snapchat  is  simple:  Send  a  photo  or
short  video  to  a  friend,  and  it  will  self-­destruct  after
10  seconds.  That  way,  it  won’t  wind  up  on  the
Internet  and  ruin  anyone’s  reputation,  friendships,
or  career.
Needless  to  say,  that  has  made  it  a  wildly  popular
choice  for  sexting.  But  Snapchat’s  appeal  goes  far
beyond  that.  In  an  age  in  which  “privacy”  and
“technology”  have  become  almost  antonymous,  it
has  been  billed  as  the  anti-­Facebook—a
communications  tool  that  deletes  your  data  rather
than  preserving,  analyzing,  and  trading  on  it.  In
short,  it’s  supposed  to  make  messaging  fun  again.
But  the  app’s  security  has  never  been  ironclad.  As
the  media  have  repeatedly  warned  parents,  and
parents  in  turn  warned  their  kids,  message
recipients  can  still  save  a  compromising  image  by
taking  a  quick  screenshot.  But  Snapchat  tries  to
mitigate  the  risk  somewhat  by  automatically
notifying  the  sender  when  that  happens.  If
someone  screenshots  you,  it’s  a  virtual  slap  in  the
face.  If  they  don’t,  you  can  assume  you’re  in  the
clear.
Except  that  apparently  you  can’t.  KSL-­TV  in  Utah
reports  that  an  Orem-­based  firm  called  Decipher
Forensics  has  figured  out  a  way  to  recover  supposedly  deleted  images  from  the  recipient’s
phone.  The  process  isn’t  simple:  24-­year-­old  Decipher  forensics  examiner  Richard  Hickman  told
the  network  that  it  takes  him  about  six  hours,  on  average,  to  image  the  phone’s  data.  So  far
he  can  only  do  it  with  Android  devices,  though  he’s  working  on  doing  the  same  for  iOS.  But  his
firm  is  now  offering  to  perform  the  recovery  procedure  for  anyone  who  wants  it,  from  parents
to  lawyers  to  the  police,  for  $300  to  $500.
Snapchat  is  trying  to  brush  off  the  finding.  “We’re  not  really  paying  much  attention  to  it,”
spokeswoman  Mary  Ritti  told  U.S.  News  on  Thursday.  “I  mean,  it’s  forensic  software.”
She  has  a  point.  Forensic  software  can  also  recover  lots  of  other  things  you  thought  you  had
deleted  from  your  phone  or  computer,  provided  the  data  hasn’t  yet  been  overwritten  by  other
files.  The  reason  we  don’t  all  live  in  fear  of  this  happening  is  because  it  requires  someone  to
take  possession  of  your  device,  then  spend  a  bunch  of  time  and  money  combing  through  the
hidden  data.  If  they  can  do  that,  odds  are  you  have  other  security  problems  on  your  hands
besides  the  potential  recovery  of  some  embarrassing  snapshots.
And  for  what  it’s  worth,  Snapchat’s  privacy  policy  explicitly  states  that  there’s  no  guarantee
your  data  will  always  be  deleted.  “Messages,  therefore,  are  sent  at  the  risk  of  the  user,”  it  says.
Still,  Snapchat’s  users  are  unlikely  to  be  mollified  if  it  turns  out  their  nude  selfies  have  been
preserved  for  posterity  after  all.
If  Snapchat’s  young  founders  soon  find  themselves  on  the  wrong  end  of  a  successful  lawsuit,
the  lesson  won’t  be  that  they  failed  at  protecting  their  users’  privacy.  It  will  be  that  it’s
dangerous  to  build  a  business  on  the  illusion  of  privacy  in  the  first  place.
Will  Oremus  is  the  lead  blogger  for
Future  Tense,  reporting  on  emerging
technologies,  tech  policy,  and  digital
culture.  Future  Tense  is  a  project  from
Slate,  the  New  America  Foundation,
and  Arizona  State  University.
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Approaches for solving the triage problem
This talk presents today’s digital forensic challenges and 
presents approaches for solving the triage problem.
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Digital information is pervasive in today’s society.
Many potential sources of digital information: 
• Desktops; Laptops 
• Tablets; Cell Phones 






Users of forensic tools have many different goals: 
• Document a conspiracy (stock fraud; murder-for-hire) 
• Investigation, intelligence & analysis  
• Establish possession of contraband information (images; movies) 
• Recover “lost” information 
• Understand and correct privacy leaks
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Many devices record information in non-obvious ways.
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Many devices record information in non-obvious ways.
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Garmin maps show where you are...
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Maps can also show where you have been.
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The Garmin GPS appears as an external USB storage 
device with directories and files.
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The file 24.gpx contains track information in XML format.
!!!!!!
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?><gpx xmlns="http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/1" 
xmlns:gpxx="http://www.garmin.com/xmlschemas/GpxExtensions/v3" xmlns:gpxtpx="http://www.garmin.com/xmlschemas/

































(Reformatted for improved readability)
<trkpt lat="38.885058" lon="-77.114068">"
       <ele>88.58</ele><time>2013-08-23T14:47:54Z</time>"
       <gpxtpx:speed>5.49</gpxtpx:speed>"




       <ele>88.10</ele><time>2013-08-23T14:47:55Z</time>"
       <gpxtpx:speed>5.49</gpxtpx:speed>"
       <gpxtpx:course>177.88</gpxtpx:course>"
</trkpt>"
!
Accuracy of 0.000001º lat is ≈ 40,000 km ÷ 360 x .000001 ≈ 0.1 m  
                    ≈ 10cm 
GPS accuracy is 7.8 meters w/ 95% confidence level 
• http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/
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The Garmin GPS stores a lot of information.










The file 24.gpx has 766,553 ÷ 266 ≈ 2,900 tracking points in it. 
• My GPS has 44MB of track points from March 7, 2013 ➙ Sept. 15, 2013 
—That’s over 150,000 tracking points! 
!
Inadvertently collected, but incredibly useful.
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LandAirSea Magnetic Wireless Pocket-Sized Tracking Key 
GPS System sold by Amazon: $139.00
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George Ford’s wife put a LandSeaAir tracker on his car 













Data collected by the device was instrumental in his murder conviction.
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Digital Forensics “research” traditionally focused on  
training,  collection & extraction
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Reverse engineeringCollection Techniques










Tools follow a simple model for manual analysis: 
• Extract data 
• Make data visibility 

















FY 12 ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
FY 12 FY11 % CHANGE
DIGITAL FORENSIC SERVICES
Agency Requests 
No. of agencies that received RCFL assistance 842 766 10%
Service Requests 
No. of requests for assistance received by RCFLs 5,060 6,318  -20%
Examinations Completed 
No. of examinations completed at RCFLs 8,566 7,629 12%
Terabytes Processed 
A terabyte (TB) is a unit of measurement for data storage capacity equivalent to 1,024 gigabytes. 
One TB is roughly equivalent to the information in 1,000 encyclopedias.
5,986 4,263 40%
Field Services 
No. of onsite operations conducted by law enforcement for which RCFLs provided assistance 553 689 -20%
Examiner Testimony in Court 
No. of times RCFL Examiners testified in court and/or at hearings. This does not include 
subpoenas to testify when testimony was not required.
101 97 4%
KIOSK SERVICES
Total Kiosk Use 
No. of times law enforcement officers used the CPIK, LMK, and VCPK 13,556 8,553 58%
Cell Phone Investigative Kiosk (CPIK) Use 
No. of times law enforcement officers used the CPIK to review cellular phones at RCFLs in 
support of investigations
8,795 5,956 48%
Loose Media Kiosk (LMK) Use 
No. of times law enforcement officers used the LMK to review loose media at RCFLs in support 
of investigations
3,665 1,683 118%
Virtual Cell Phone Kiosk (VCPK) Use 
No. of times law enforcement officers used the VCPK (only available through the HARCFL) to 
remotely review cellular telephones from their agencies in support of investigations)
1,096 914 20%
BY THE NUMBERS




Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory Program 
FISCAL YEAR
ANNUAL REPORT
My work focuses on developing better approaches for 
automation and analysis — “big data for little devices”
Automatically identify high-value data. 
—Contacts, calendar, documents 
—Software 
—GPS / Temporal 
!
Correlate — devices with identical or similar copies. 
• previously unknown organizations or networks 
• data/threats that are unusual or emerging 
!
Presentation and Integration: 
• Make the results understandable. 
• Effect organizational change through adoption & integration 
!
Human Language Technology 
• Apply to ةةييببررععللاا ,תיִרְבִע, español, 汉语/漢語, ⽇日本語, svenska, etc.
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1. Work with “big data.” 
• “Big data” is our advantage — use it! 
• Many techniques developed on small systems don’t scale
Three principles underly this research.
!37
1. Work with “big data.” 
2. Automation is essential. 
• Today most forensic analysis is done manually. 
• We are developing techniques & tools to allow automation.
Three principles underly this research.
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1. Work with “big data.” 
2. Automation is essential. 
3. Concentrate on bulk data. 
• Leverage data that are fragmented and incomplete 
—Deleted and partially overwritten files 









—Sencar & Memon,”Identification and recovery of JPEG files with missing fragments,” 
DFRWS 2009
Three principles underly this research.
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corresponding to deleted files, the restart markers are
searched. After identifying any of the seven restart markers,
all the bits prior tomarker position are discarded and resulting
data is merged with the first part of the file or with the header
extracted from the original JPEG file and decoded. Recovered
files are displayed in Fig. 5. It can be seen that fragments of the
original file can be successfully recovered. It should be noted
that because the stored image size in the header is not
modified, in all cases images appear in the right size, but the
content is shifted.
5.2. Recovery of stand-alone fragments by use of pseudo
headers
Obviously without a valid header, a JPEG file or a part of it
cannot be decoded. Given this fact, in this section, we pose the
question of what information one will need to reconstruct
a pseudo header that can be utilized in decoding of a stand-
alone file fragment. The information that can be inferred by
analysis of encoded file data will not be sufficient to recon-
struct a file header. Our premise is that image files stored on
a recovery medium will be interrelated to some extent. This
relationmay exist because imagesmay have been captured by
the same camera, edited by the same software tools, or
downloaded from the same Web pages. All these factors
induce different levels of shared information among the
neighboring files in terms of their encoding properties which
may vary from image quality settings to specifications of the
encoder. Therefore, in essence, we will investigate the
possible use of encoding related information from recovered
files in recovery of stand-alone fragments.
Considering only baseline JPEG/JFIF images, the most
common JPEG encoding method used by most digital cameras
and on the Web, the information needed to encode/decode an
image can be categorized into four types. These are:
1. the width and height of the image specified in number of
pixels;
2. the 8! 8 quantization tables used during compression;
3. the number of color components and type of chroma sub-
sampling used in composition of MCUs; and
4. the Huffman code tables.
Decoder essentially needs image size so that the number of
MCUs can be computed and the image blocks obtained by
decoding of each of the MCUs can be laid out at their proper
locations on the image. Since the encoded values are not the
quantized values, but the associated quantizer bin values,
quantization tables are needed to perform de-quantization
prior to inverse-DCT transformation. The composition of
Fig. 5 – Recovered files after erasure of random amounts of data from tail (upper left), center (upper center and right), and
both header and tail parts (lower row) of the original image.
d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 6 ( 2 0 0 9 ) S 8 8 – S 9 8 S95
MISSING JPEG TOP
MISSING JPEG BOTTOM
Example: Integrating Human Language Technology with 
Digital Forensics
Problems:  
• Forensic examiners spend significant time looking for “unusual” file names. 
• Many of the file names are not in English. 
!
Solution: 
• Model of what makes file names “unusual.” 
• Translate non-English file names into English. 
!
New problem: path names are ambiguous and frequently multi-lingual. 
• Documents and Settings/defaultuser/ Mes documents/Ma musique/Desktop.ini 
• Mis Documentos/SalvadorJP/Excel/ GRUPOS.xls 
• Documents and Settings/3742008/ Configuración local/Datos de programa/ Microsoft/Internet 
Explorer/. 
• top.com/ةیيتاموولعملاا ةلسلسلاا/يتامیيمصت.jpg  
    becomes: 
top.com/My designs/The computer-based series.jpg 
!
—Rowe, Neil, Schwamm, Riqui, Garfinkel, Simson. Language Translation for File Paths, DFRWS 
2013, Aug 4-7, 2013. Monterey, CA. BEST PAPER AWARD
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The Real Data Corpus (60TB) 
• Disks, camera cards, & cell phones purchased on the secondary market. 
• Most contain data from previous users. 
• Mostly acquire outside the US: 
—Canada, China, England, Germany, France,  
India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Palestine, etc. 
• Thousands of devices (HDs, CDs, DVDs, flash, etc.) 
!
Mobile Phone Application Corpus  
• Android Applications; Mobile Malware; etc. 
!
The problems we encounter obtaining, curating and exploiting this data 
mirror those of national organizations 
—Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev and Dinolt, Bringing Science to Digital Forensics with 
Standardized Forensic Corpora, DFRWS 2009. BEST PAPER AWARD. 
—http://digitalcorpora.org/ 
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We do science with “real data.”
Files from US Government Web Servers (500GB) 
• ≈1 million heterogeneous files 
—Documents (Word, Excel, PDF, etc.); Images (JPEG, PNG, etc.) 
—Database Files; HTML files; Log files; XML 
• Freely redistributable; Many different file types 
• This database was surprising difficulty to collect, curate, and distribute: 
—Scale created data collection and management problems. 
—Copyright, Privacy & Provenance issues. 








We manufacture data that can be freely redistributed.
      <abstract>This data set contains data for birds caught 
with mistnets and with other means for sampling Avian 
Influenza (AI)….</abstract>
 <abstract>NOAA&apos;s National Geophysical Data Center 
(NGDC) is building high-resolution digital elevation models 
(DEMs) for select U.S. coastal regions. … </abstract>
Challenges Facing 
Digital Forensics
Extracting digital evidence was simple five years ago.







• "Forensic copy" or "disk image."
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Forensic copy  (“disk image”) 
stored on a storage array.
Original device stored in 
evidence locker.
“Write Blocker” prevents 
accidental overwriting.
Analyzing digital evidence was simple five years ago.
Commercial tools extracted files from disk images 
• Display of allocated & deleted files. 
• String search 
• File extraction 
• File “carving” 
• Examining disk sectors 
!
Job of analyst: 
• Find interesting data 
• Report on it. 
!
!45
Today Digital Forensics is faced with 5 crippling challenges:
1. Device Diversity 
!
!
2. Data Diversity 
!
3. Data Scale 
!
!
4. Human Capital       ➞                       
!
!
5. Cloud & Encryption
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Electronics  ›  "128gb  micro  sd"
Sort  by   RelevanceShowing  1  -­  24  of  867  Results
Related  Searches:  128gb  micro  sd  card  class  10,  128gb  sd,  64gb  micro  sd.
  
$99.99  $55.33  
Order  in  the  next  4  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
(3,511)
SanDisk  Ultra  64  GB  MicroSDXC
Class  10  UHS-­1  Memory  Card  with
Adapter  (SDSDQU-­064G-­AFFP-­A)
See  Size  &  Style  Options
$99.99  $55.33  
Order  in  the  next  4  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$49.70  new  (30  offers)
$50.48  used  (3  offers)
(3,511)
SanDisk  Ultra  64  GB  microSDXC
Class  10  UHS-­1  Memory  Card
30MB/s  with  Adapter  SDSDQUA-­
064G-­U46A
See  Size  &  Style  Options
$299.99  $140.95
Only  1  left  in  stock  -­  order  soon.
More  Buying  Choices
$140.95  new  (54  offers)
(19)
Product  Description
...  latest  SD  memory  card  standard,  available  in
64GB  and  128GB,  for  ...
SanDisk  Extreme  128  GB  Secure




Order  in  the  next  4  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$49.66  new  (20  offers)
(157)
Product  Features
...  64GB  microSDXC  card  Ultra  adaptability  -­  using
the  included  SD  ...
SanDisk  64GB  Ultra  MicroSDXC
Class  10  Memory  Card  with  SD
Adapter  -­  Retail  Packaging
  
$39.99  $21.37  
Order  in  the  next  5  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$16.97  new  (33  offers)
$19.82  used  (2  offers)
(2,473)
Product  Description
...  20,800  images  **  or  128  hours  **  16  GB  *
(microSDHC)  4,000  3.5  minute  ...
SanDisk  microSDHC  32GB  Flash




Order  in  the  next  5  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$134.95  new  (48  offers)
$152.58  used  (1  offer)
(58)
Product  Description
...  I  card  is  available  in  64GB  and  128GB




Lexar  Professional  400x  128GB
SDXC  UHS-­I  Flash  Memory  Card
LSD128CTBNA400
See  Size  Options














High  Capacity  Memory  Cards
8  GB  &  Under
16  GB
32  GB
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Electronics  ›  "4tb  sata"
Sort  by   RelevanceShowing  1  -­  24  of  3,947  Results
Related  Searches:  2tb  sata,  3tb  sata.
  
$209.99  $189.99  
Order  in  the  next  5  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$180.99  new  (8  offers)
(1,096)
Product  Description
...  Seagate  4TB  Desktop  HDD  The  world's  only  4-­
disk  4TB  drive  for  improved  ...
Product  Details
·  4  TB  Serial  ATA-­600
Seagate  Desktop  HD   4  TB  SATA
6Gb/s  NCQ  64MB  Cache  3.5-­Inch
Internal  Bare  Drive  ST4000DM000
See  Size  Options
$336.00  $252.85
Only  1  left  in  stock  -­  order  soon.
More  Buying  Choices
$249.99  new  (5  offers)
$238.09  used  (1  offer)
(13)
Product  Description
...  sizes  up  to  4TB  and  featuring  the  first  6Gbit/sec
SATA  interface  in  a  ...
Product  Details
·  64  MB
·  4  TB  Serial  ATA-­600
HG T  Deskstar  3.5-­Inch  4TB  7200




Order  in  the  next  4  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$205.50  new  (3  offers)
(7)
Product  Description
...  Kit  -­  Hard  drive  -­  4  TB  -­  internal  -­  3.5"  -­
SATA-­600  -­  buffer:  32  MB  ...
Product  Details
·  4  TB  Serial  ATA-­600
HGST  Deskstar  3.5-­Inch  4TB
CoolSpin  SATA  III  6Gbps  Internal
Hard  Drive  Kit  32  MB  Cache  3.5
Internal  Bare  or  OEM...
  
$269.99  $129.48  
Order  in  the  next  4  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$115.00  new  (51  offers)
$88.00  used  (8  offers)
(1,096)
Product  Features
3TB  storage  capacity  with  SATA  6Gb/s  NCQ
Interface
Seagate  Barracuda  3  TB  HDD  SATA
6  Gb/s  NCQ  64MB  Cache  3.5-­Inch
Internal  Bare  Drive  ST3000DM001
See  Size  Options
$249.99  $107.72  
Order  in  the  next  4  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$89.00  new  (91  offers)
$74.00  used  (3  offers)
(120)
Product  Description
...  RE4  7200  RPM  Enterprise  SATA  hard  drives
offer  capacities  up  to  2  TB  ...
WD  RE4  1  TB  Enterprise  Hard  Drive:




Order  in  the  next  5  hours  and  get  it  by
Thursday,  Apr  4.
More  Buying  Choices
$217.99  new  (3  offers)
Product  Description
...  means  to  effectively  utilize  your  4TB  Barracuda
drive,  even  with  ...
SEAGATE  ST4000DX000  Barracuda
4TB  7200  RPM  128MB  cache  SATA
6.0Gb/s  3.5  internal  hard  drive  (Bare
Drive)
  


































  80  GB  &  Under
  81  to  120  GB
  121  to  320  GB
  321  to  500  GB
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Mobile devices exhibit multiple challenges.
Operating system: 
• Android?  iPhone?  Blackberry?  Feature Phone? 
!
Access to the data: 
• PIN lock? 
• Encrypted Storage? 
• Stored locally or in the cloud? 
!
Applications: 
• Built-in? Downloaded from “App Store”? 
• Custom-written? 
• Self-destruct / remote wipe? 
• Malware? 
!
Human Language: English? Korean? Chinese? 
!47





CPU 260 MHz, 32-bit
RAM 8MiB
Interfaces USB, microSD, SIM
Wireless Quadband GSM, Bluetooth
Power Li-Poly battery, includes adapter
Display Two-color OLED
http://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=3040
The “CSI Effect” creates unrealistic expectations.
TV digital forensics: 
• Every investigator is trained on every tool 
• Correlation is easy and instantaneous 
• There are no false positives 
• Overwritten data can be recovered 
• Encrypted data can usually be cracked 
• It is impossible to delete anything 
!
The reality: 
• Overwritten data cannot be recovered 
• Encrypted data usually can't be decrypted 
• Forensics rarely answers questions or establishes guilt 
• Tools crash a lot 
!
—Digital Forensics: a difficult process that looks easy
!49
EnCase
Digital Forensics must respond with new science.
Current approaches don’t scale 
• User spent years assembling email, documents, etc. 
• Analysts have days or hours to process it 
• Police analyze top-of-the-line systems  
—with top-of-the-line systems 
• National Labs have large-scale server farms  
—to analyze huge collections 
!
Our approach: leverage our massive data advantage 
• Outlier detection and correlation 
• Operate autonomously on incomplete, heterogeneous datasets 
• Automatically recalibrate; no false positives
!50
The Triage Problem
Digital media triage:  
Deciding where to start











Where do you start?
!52
We have developed many triage techniques.
1. Histogram analysis 
—We count the results 
!
!
2. Optimistic decompression 
—We try to decompress the data 
!
3. Cross-drive analysis 
—We look for two computers with the same email address 
!
4. sector hashing 
—We look at individual disk sectors. 
!
5. Random sampling 









Email addresses can reveal: 
• User(s) of a device 
• Associates 










• Today’s forensic tools implement two strategies for extracting email addresses. 
1.Text extraction from files 
2.Text extraction from bulk data
























With string search, you only find what you are looking for.
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bulk_extractor extracts email addresses.
For each email address, reports location, email address, & context 
!
34427974!grafta@bl.com!       \x028\x00\x08\x01.\x01\xE4c\x00!
24900678!grafta@bl.com!       \x028\x00\x08\x01.\x01\xE4c\x00!
50392739!inet@microsoft.com! ica Server" by " !
26735686!grafta@bl.com!       \x028\x00\x08\x01.\x01\xE4c\x00!
39265456!domexuser2@gmail.com!tocol>\x0D\x0A\x09\x09<n!
39267100!domexuser2@live.com! tocol>\x0D\x0A\x09\x09<na!
39269992!domexuser1@gmail.com!il - - domexuser1@gmail.com !




51781228!dbaron@dbaron.org! L. David Baron <dbaron@dbaron.org!
51788157!bzbarsky@mit.edu! oris Zbarsky\x0A# <bzbarsky@mit.e!
51789901!bzbarsky@mit.edu! oris Zbarsky\x0A# <bzbarsky@mit.e!
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It’s important to distinguish email addresses that are 
relevant to a case from those that are not.
The #4 address is ips@mail.ips.es 







Other sources that to ignore: 
• Windows binaries; SSL certificates; Sample documents; News Stories 
!
Ignore lists are expensive to maintain. 
• Find them automatically by analyzing multiple drives! 




















Email addresses might be in any file, any sector: 







TEXT TEXT TEXT 
XYZ@COMPANY.
COM TEXT TEXT  
TEXT TEXT
➼
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
Every email address is a sequence of bytes.
A simple email address: 
XYZ@company.com!
!
Stored on disk / in memory as 15 bytes: 
X  Y  Z  @  c   o   m   p  a   n   y  .  c   o   m!
!
Each byte is 8-bits. Range is 0-255 
88 89 90 64 99 111 109 112 97 110 121 46 99 111 109!
!
Normally bytes are displayed in hexadecimal notation: 
58 59 5a 40 63  6f  6d  70 61  6e  79 2e 63  6f 6d!
!
!
This is called UNICODE (UTF-8)
!60
Every email address is a sequence of bytes.
A simple email address: 
XYZ@company.com!
!
Stored on disk / in memory as 15 bytes: 
X  Y  Z  @  c   o   m   p  a   n   y  .  c   o   m!
!
Each byte is 8-bits. Range is 0-255 
88 89 90 64 99 111 109 112 97 110 121 46 99 111 109!
!
Normally bytes are displayed in hexadecimal notation: 
58 59 5a 40 63  6f  6d  70 61  6e  79 2e 63  6f 6d!
!
!
This is called UNICODE (UTF-8)
!60






a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.!
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..!
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\!
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B!
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(!
3c58 595a 4043 4f4d 5041 4e59 2e43 4f4d  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM!
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+!
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
Email addresses like these can be found with  
regular expressions
!62
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.!
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..!
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\!
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B!
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(!
3c58 595a 4043 4f4d 5041 4e59 2e43 4f4d  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM!
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+!






data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
data data data data data data data data data data data data data data
Problem: byte sequences can be encoded in many ways.
XYZ@company.com 
!
• Unicode: “XYZ@company.com”  
58 59 5a 40 63 6f 6d 70 61 6e 79 2e 63 6f 6d!
!
• Base 16: “58595a40636f6d70616e792e636f6d0a” 
3538 3539 3561 3430 3633 3666 3664 3730  58595a40636f6d70!
3631 3665 3739 3265 3633 3666 3664 3061  616e792e636f6d0a!
!
• Base 64: “WFlaQGNvbXBhbnkuY29tCg===” 
5746 6c61 5147 4e76 6258 4268 626e 6b75  WFlaQGNvbXBhbnku!
5932 3974 4367 3d3d 3d0a                 Y29tCg===.!
!
• Compression: echo “XYZ@company.com” | compress | xxd 
1f9d 9058 b268 0132 e64d 1b38 61dc e471  ...X.h.2.M.8a..q!
51b0 8d02                                Q...!
!63
Compression works by eliminating repeated sequences:
Computers use compression to save memory: 
!
5859 5a40 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  XYZ@company.com !
4142 4340 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  ABC@company.com !
4445 4640 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  DEF@company.com!
!
!
Compressed with “gzip:” 
!
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.!
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W!
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000            7.>..U..0...!
!
Compressed email addresses do not “look” like email addresses! 
—You can’t find them with regular expressions!
!64
It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
!65
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.!
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..!
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\!
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B!
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(!
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM!
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+!




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....!
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.!
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W!
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......!
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
Mother.JPG
It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.!
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..!
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\!
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B!
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(!
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM!
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+!




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....!
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.!
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W!
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......!





e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....!
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.!
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W!
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......!
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
bulk_extractor breaks the disk into individual blocks.
!67
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.!
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..!
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\!
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B!
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(!
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM!
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+!





e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....!
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.!
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W!
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......!
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
Each block is tested for compressed data. 
Within each block, we check each byte.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.!
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..!
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\!
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B!
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(!
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM!
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+!





TEST 1 TEST 2 TEST 3
TEST 4 TEST 5 TEST 6
TEST 7 TEST 8 TE T 9














135 out of 5700 email addresses are invisible to other forensic tools.







Cleartext 358 -- 5341 --
All Comp -- 9 -- 135
GZIP 50 13 1 22 14
HIBER 39 6 1 27 5
HIBER-GZIP 23 21 2
PDF 88 1 9 78
ZIP 28 2 5 3 18
ZIP-PDF 18 18
bulk_extractor run on a disk from India (IN10-0138) found 
many compressed email addresses.
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We extended the analysis to 1,646 disk images 
and many codings.
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Coding                                 Drives      Emails       max!
---------------------------------------------  ----------   --------!
1) Plain in files                         739      81,920     4,206!
2) Comp in files                          355      19,711     5,454!
3) Plain in non-files                     860   1,956,059   178,073!
4) Comp in non-files                      474     165,481    59,376!
          BASE64 Comp                      54         219        50!
          BASE64-GZIP Comp                  2          64        37!
          GZIP Comp                       234      66,195     9,103!
          GZIP-BASE64 Comp                  7          44        11!
          GZIP-GZIP Comp                   15      12,663    11,845!
          GZIP-GZIP-BASE64 Comp             2          38        30!
          GZIP-GZIP-GZIP Comp               4          58        38!
          GZIP-GZIP-ZIP Comp                1          12        12!
          GZIP-PDF Comp                     5          38        30!
          GZIP-ZIP Comp                     6          49        30!
          HIBER Comp                       79       1,433       217!
          PDF Comp                        162       2,352       238!
          ZIP Comp                        388      85,252    59,369!
          ZIP-BASE64 Comp                   5          30        13!
          ZIP-BASE64-GZIP Comp              2          65        38!
          ZIP-GZIP Comp                    14         261       132!
          ZIP-PDF Comp                     26         115        18!
We can scan for credit card numbers (CCNs),  
phone numbers, addresses, and other structured info.









13152133     'CHASE NA|5422-4128-3008-3685|!
13152440     'DISCOVER|6011-0052-8056-4504|!
13152589     .'GE CARD|4055-9000-0378-1959|!
13152740     BANK ONE |4332-2213-0038-0832|!
13153182     .'NORWEST|4829-0000-4102-9233|!
















Most drives had just a few,  
















“Design Principles for Software that is Simultaneously Secure and Usable,” Garfinkel, MIT PhD Thesis, 2005
Most drives had just a few,  


















































35 CCNs in common!
What would it mean if two drives  

































Scenario #2:  
Both drives received a message from a third party.
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2 0 0 4 0




Cross Drive Analysis (CDA) computes the correlation matrix 










This correlation of 250 drives automatically identified media 
from the same organization.
!78
Garfinkel, S., Forensic Feature Extraction and 
Cross-Drive Analysis,The 6th Annual Digital 
Forensic Research Workshop Lafayette, Indiana, 
August 14-16, 2006.
This correlation of 250 drives automatically identified media 
from the same organization.
Drives #74 x #77
25 CCNS
in common
Drives #171 & #172
13 CCNS
in common










Garfinkel, S., Forensic Feature Extraction and 
Cross-Drive Analysis,The 6th Annual Digital 
Forensic Research Workshop Lafayette, Indiana, 
August 14-16, 2006.
A relatively small JPEG:
Sector hashing uses fragments of JPEGs as identifiers.
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Bytes: 31,046 


























—Garfinkel, Simson, Vassil Roussev, Alex Nelson and 
Douglas White, Using purpose-built functions and block 
hashes to enable small block and sub-file forensics, 
DFRWS 2010, Portland, OR  
This JPEG has 61 sectors.  
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Bytes: 31,046  
Sectors: 61










Each BLUE sector is distinct. 
• Each has a distinct sequence of bytes 
dd6a d66f baac 8660 829b b59c 329c 006d!
4dbc 5884 5104 3d9b fcae d375 1fab 3ff5!
766e 81c0 12f6 b1a0 5bec ab9a f425 9432!
02ec bace 23d6 eba0 762b 4b9f 53d0 61de!
e003 059c f75c dc9c fdd5 63e2 2696 74af!
....!
!
• Each has a distinct MD5 “finger print.” 
2b00042f7481c7b056c4b410d28f33cf
This JPEG has 61 sectors.  
41 of the sectors are “distinct” — not repeated elsewhere.
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Sectors: 61
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21
22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 35 36 37
38 39 40 41
If the image is on a hard drive,  
each “block” of the image occupies one sector.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21
22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 35 36 37





The sectors are distinct! 
∴ A single sector ➜ the image was probably on the drive.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21
22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 35 36 37










Two modes of operation: 
1. Scan for fragments of deleted files. 
2. Use random sampling to scan a 1TB 
drive in 10 minutes 
p=.99 of finding a sector 
!
Young J., Foster, K., Garfinkel, S., and Fairbanks, K., Distinct sector 
hashes for target file detection, IEEE Computer, December 2012
US agents encounter a hard drive at a border crossings... 
• Media can be rapidly searched in a way that respects privacy. 
—5-10 minutes 





Searches turn up rooms filled with servers…. 
• Systems can be automatically analyzed 
• Servers likely to contain evidence can be manually reviewed. 
• Connections between servers can be inferred automatically. 
!
Big challenge: tool development and deployment.
!85
Law enforcement is a typical application for this technology.
Where do we go from here?
CS PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE, P. 6
COMPUTING CONVERSATIONS: VINT CERF, P. 10
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systems consisted of simple I/O devices that transmitted 
the signals between master and remote terminal units. In 
recent years, SCADA systems have evolved to communi-
cate over public IP networks.2 Some are also connected to a 
corporate intranet or directly to the Internet to seamlessly 
integrate SCADA data with external information such as 
corporate email or weather data. 
The integration of SCADA systems within a much wider 
network brings threats that were unimagined at the time 
these systems were conceived. During the past decade, 
vendors, asset owners, and regulators recognized this 
growing concern and began to address it through new 
laws and various security mechanisms, processes, and 
standards.3   
The discoveries in the wild of Stuxnet in June 2010 
and Flame in May 2012 were additional eye-openers for 
SCADA owners and operators. Stuxnet, the first known 
malware designed to target automation systems, has 
infected 50,000 to 100,000 computers worldwide,4 while 
Flame is a cyberespionage tool an order of magnitude more 
sophisticated than Stuxnet.5 
SCADA ARCHITECTURE
As Figure 1 shows, a typical SCADA system for control-
ling infrastructures for utilities such as power, gas, oil, 
or water generally consists of a control center and nu-
merous field sites. The sites are distributed over a wide 
geographical area and are connected to the control center 
by different communication media such as satellites, wide 
A n industrial automation and control system is a set of devices that regulate the behavior of physical processes. For example, a thermo-stat is a simple control system that senses the 
temperature and turns a heater on or off to maintain 
the temperature at a set point. These systems are used 
to monitor and control industrial and infrastructure 
processes such as chemical plant and oil refinery opera-
tions, electricity generation and distribution, and water 
management. 
A control system that is spread over a wide area and 
can supervise its individual components is often called a 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system.1 
However, here we use the term SCADA to refer to all kinds 
of control systems that share a common key characteristic: 
they are connected to physical processes and thus need 
to be continuously available and able to respond within a 
deterministic time bound.  
Early SCADA systems were intended to run as isolated 
networks, not connected to the Internet, and thus did not 
require any specific cybersecurity mechanisms. These 
When security incidents occur, several 
challenges exist for conducting an effective 
forensic investigation of SCADA systems, 
which run 24/7 to control and monitor 
industrial and infrastructure processes. 
Irfan Ahmed, University of New Orleans
Sebastian Obermeier and Martin Naedele, ABB Corporate Research
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2011, malware attacks on the Android platform increased 
3,325 percent.10 As the use of smartphones continues its 
rapid growth, subscribers must be assured that the services 
they offer are reliable, secure, and trustworthy.
SMARTPHONE THREATS AND ATTACKS
In a smartphone threat model, a malicious user publishes 
malware disguised as a normal application through an app 
store or website. Users will unintentionally download the 
malware to a smartphone, which carries a large amount of 
sensitive data. After infiltrating a smartphone, the malware 
attempts to control its resources, collect data, or redirect the 
smartphone to a premium account or malicious website. 
This model divides a smartphone into three layers:
 t The application layer includes all of the smartphone’s 
apps, such as social networking software, email, text 
messaging, and synchronization software. 
 t The communication layer includes the carrier net-
works, Wi-Fi connectivity, Bluetooth network, Micro 
USB ports, and MicroSD slots. Malware can spread 
through any of these channels. 
 t The resource layer includes the flash memory, camera, 
microphone, and sensors within a smartphone. Be-
cause smartphones contain sensitive data, malware 
targets their resources to control them and manipu-
late data from them. 
An attack forms a loop starting with the launch of the 
malware, moving through the smartphone’s application, 
communication, and resource layers, on to premium ac-
counts/malicious websites, and back to the malicious user. 
Figure 1 shows such an attack. 
S martphones are quickly becoming the dominant device for accessing Internet resources. Sales of smartphones overtook PC sales in the global market in Q4 2010.1 Shipments of smartphones 
surpassed those of feature phones in Western Europe 
in Q2 2011.2 According to a May 2011 Nielsen survey, 
smartphones outsold feature phones in the US in this 
same period.3 Compared to 5.9 billion worldwide mobile 
phone subscribers, smartphone usage (835 million) is still 
steadily increasing.4 IDC predicts smartphone shipments 
will approach one billion in 2015.5
Smartphones offer many more functions than tradi-
tional mobile phones. In addition to a preinstalled mobile 
operating system, such as iOS, Android, or Windows 
Mobile, most smartphones also typically support carrier 
networks, Wi-Fi connectivity, and Bluetooth so that users 
can access the Internet to download and run various third-
party applications. Most smartphones support Multimedia 
Message Service (MMS) and include embedded sensors 
such as GPS, gyroscopes, and accelerometers, as well as 
a high-resolution camera, a microphone, and a speaker. 
Smartphones’ increasing popularity raises many secu-
rity concerns.6-9 Their central data management makes 
them easy targets for hackers. Since the first mobile phone 
viruses emerged in 2004, smartphone users have reported 
significant malware attacks. In the last seven months of 
Because of their unique characteristics, 
smartphones present challenges requiring 
new business models that offer counter-
measures to help ensure their security.
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There are many limitations when using file hashes to 
identify known content. Because changing just a single 
bit of a file changes its hash, pornographers, malware au-
thors, and other miscreants can evade detection simply by 
changing a comma to a period or appending a few random 
bytes to a file. Likewise, hash-based identification will not 
work if sections of the file are damaged or otherwise un-
recoverable. This is especially a problem when large video 
files are deleted and the operating system reuses a few 
sectors for other purposes: most of the video is still present 
on the drive, but recovered video segments will not appear 
in a database of file hashes.
SECTOR HASHING
We are developing alternative systems for detecting 
target files in large disk images using cryptographic hashes 
on sectors of data rather than entire files. Modern file sys-
tems align the start of most files with the beginning of a 
disk sector. Thus, when a megabyte-sized video is stored on 
a modern hard drive, the first 4 kibibytes are stored in one 
disk sector, the second 4 KiBytes are stored in another disk 
sector, typically the adjacent one, and so on. (In our work, 
we distinguish between power-of-two-based sizes of digital 
artifacts, such as kibibytes, and power-of-ten-based sizes, 
such as kilobytes. See the “Decimal versus Binary Prefixes” 
sidebar for more details.) Furthermore, by sampling ran-
domly chosen sectors from the drive, it is only necessary 
to read a tiny fraction of the drive to determine with high 
probability if a target file is present. This enables rapid triage 
of drive images.  
We compare drive sector hashes to a hash database of 
fixed-sized file fragments, which we call blocks. The terms 
“sector” and “block” are often used incorrectly as syn-
F orensic examiners frequently search disk drives, cell phones, and even network flows to determine if specific known content is present. For example, a corporate security officer might examine a sus-
picious employee’s laptop for unauthorized documents; 
law enforcement officers might search a suspect’s home 
computer for illegal pornography; and network analysts 
might reconstruct Transmission Control Protocol streams 
to determine if malware was downloaded. In these and 
many other cases, examiners typically identify files by 
computing their cryptographic hash—often with MD5 or 
SHA1 hash algorithms—and then searching a database for 
the resulting hash value. 
Use of hash values for file identification is pervasive 
in digital forensics—every popular forensics pack-
age has built-in support. One of the most widely used 
databases is the National Software Reference Library 
(NSRL) Reference Data Set (RDS). Version 2.36, released 
in March 2012, contains 25,892,924 distinct file hashes 
(www.nsrl.nist.gov). Other databases are available to 
customers of specific companies and to law enforcement 
organizations.
Using an alternative approach to traditional 
file hashing, digital forensic investigators 
can hash individually sampled subject 
drives on sector boundaries and then 
check these hashes against a prebuilt da-
tabase, making it possible to process raw 
media without reference to the underlying 
file system. 
Joel Young, Kristina Foster, and Simson Garfinkel, Naval Postgraduate School
Kevin Fairbanks, Johns Hopkins University
Distinct 
Sector Hashes 
for Target File 
Detection
IEEE Computer, December 2012
For further reading...
“Digital Forensics,” American Scientist, Sept-Oct 2013 
http://simson.net/clips/academic/2013.AmericanScientist.pdf
!88
370     American Scientist, Volume 101
Since the 1980s, computers have had an increasing role in all as-pects of human life—including an involvement in criminal acts. 
This development has led to the rise of 
digital forensics, the uncovering and in-
depth examination of evidence located 
on all things electronic with memory ca-
pacity, including computers, cell phones, 
and networks. Because of both the scale 
and the diversity of their domain, digi-
tal forensics researchers and practitio-
ners stand at the forefront of some of the 
most challenging problems in computer 
science today, including “big data” anal-
ysis, natural language processing, data 
visualizations and cybersecurity. 
Compared with traditional forensic 
science, digital forensics poses signifi-
cant challenges. Information on a com-
puter system can be changed without 
a trace; the scale of data that must be 
analyzed is vast; and the variety of data 
types is enormous. Just as a traditional 
forensic investigator must be prepared 
to analyze any kind of smear or frag-
ment, no matter the source, a digital in-
vestigator must be able to make sense 
of any data that might be found on any 
device anywhere on the planet—a very 
difficult proposition.
From its inception, digital forensics has 
served two different purposes, each with 
its own difficulties. First, in many cases 
computers contain evidence of a crime 
that took place in the physical world. The 
computer was all but incidental—except 
that computerization has made the evi-
dence harder for investigators to analyze 
than paper records. For example, finan-
cial scam artist Bernard Madoff kept track 
of his victims’ accounts using an IBM 
AS/400 minicomputer from the 1980s. 
The age of the computer helped perpetu-
ate his crime, because few people on Wall 
Street have experience with 25-year-old 
technology, and it created an added com-
plication after Madoff was arrested, be-
cause investigators had few tools with 
which to make sense of his data. 
Today personal computers are so ubiq-
uitous that the collection and use of digi-
tal evidence has become a common part 
of many criminal and civil investigations. 
Suspects in murder cases routinely have 
their laptops and cell phones examined 
for corroborating evidence. Corporate 
litigation is also dominated by electronic 
discovery of incriminating material. 
The second class of digital forensics 
cases are those in which the crime was 
inherently one involving computer sys-
tems, such as computer hacking. In these 
instances, investigators are often ham-
pered by the technical sophistication of 
the systems and the massive amount of 
evidence to analyze.
Digital forensics is powerful because 
computer systems are windows into the 
past. Many systems retain vast quanti-
ties of information—either intentionally, 
in the form of log files and archives, or 
inadvertently, as a result of software that 
does not cleanly erase memory and files. 
As a result, investigators can frequently 
recover old email messages, chat logs, 
Google search terms, and other kinds of 
data that were created weeks, months or 
even years before. Such contemporane-
ous records can reveal an individual’s 
state-of-mind or intent at the time the 
crime was being committed.
But whereas pre-computer evidence, 
such as handwritten letters and photo-
graphs, could be reproduced and given 
to attorneys, judges, and juries, comput-
erized evidence requires special han-
dling and analysis. Electronic data are 
easily changed, damaged or erased if 
handled improperly. Simply turning on 
a consumer GPS may cause the device 
to delete critical evidence. Additionally, 
computers frequently harbor hidden ev-
idence that may only be revealed when 
specialized tools are used—for example, 
a digital camera may appear to have 30 
photos, but expert examination may re-
veal that another 300 deleted photos can 
be recovered. (When a device “erases” a 
file, it doesn’t clear the memory space, 
but rather notes that the space is avail-
able; the file may not be really deleted 
until a new one is written over it.)
Because they can look into the past 
and uncover hidden data, digital foren-
Simson L. Garfinkel earned a Ph.D. in com-
puter science from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology in 2005. He is an associate 
professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
He holds six U.S. patents for computer-related 
research and has written 14 books, including 
Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in 
the 21st Century (O’Reilley, 2000). Internet: 
http://simson.net
Digital Forensics
Finding and preserving evidence of crime in electronic memory requires  
careful methods as well as technical skill
Simson L. Garfinkel
QFeature Article
Information on a computer system can be 
changed without a trace, the scale of data 
to be analyzed is vast, and the variety of 
data types is enormous.
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sics tools are increasingly employed be-
yond the courtroom. Security profession-
als routinely use such tools to analyze 
network intrusions—not to convict the 
attacker, but to understand how the per-
petrator gained access and plug the hole. 
Data recovery firms rely on similar tools 
to resurrect files from drives that have 
been inadvertently formatted or dam-
aged. Forensic tools can also detect the 
unintentional disclosures of personal in-
formation. In 2009 the Inspector General 
of the U.S. Department of Defense issued 
a report stating that many hard drives 
were not properly wiped of data before 
leaving government service. 
Digital evidence can even be exam-
ined to show that something did not hap-
pen. Here they are less powerful, for the 
well-known reason that the absence of 
evidence is not the evidence of absence. 
In May 2006 a laptop and external hard 
drive containing sensitive personal in-
formation of 26.5 million veterans and 
military personnel was stolen from an 
employee at the Department of Veterans 
Affairs. After the laptop was recovered in 
June 2006, forensic investigators analyzed 
the media and determined that the sensi-
tive files probably had not been viewed. 
One way to make such a judgment is 
by examining the access and modifica-
tion times associated with each file on 
the computer’s hard drive. But someone 
taking advantage of the same forensic 
techniques could have viewed the lap-
top files without modifying those time-
stamps, so the investigators really deter-
mined only that the files had not been 
opened by conventional means.
These examples emphasize that 
the possibilites of digital forensics are 
bounded not by technology but by 
what is practical for people doing the 
job. Convictions are frequently the mea-
sure of success. In many cases there is a 
considerable gap between what is theo-
retically possible and what is necessary; 
even though there may be an intellectual 
desire to analyze every last byte, there is 
rarely a reason to do so.
Following Procedures
Digital forensics relies on a kit of tools 
and techniques that can be applied 
equally to suspects, victims, and by-
standers. A cell phone found on a dead 
body without identification would al-
most certainly be subjected to analysis, 
but so would a phone dropped during 
a house burglary. How the analysis is 
performed is therefore more a matter of 
legal issues than technological ones. As 
the field has grown, practitioners have 
tried to create a consistent but flexible 
approach to performing an investigation, 
despite such policy variations. Several 
such digital forensic models have been pro-
posed, but most have common elements. 
Before data can be analyzed, they are 
collected from the field (the “scene of the 
crime”), stabilized, and preserved to cre-
ate a lasting record. Understanding the 
inner workings of how computers store 
data is key to accurately reproducing it. 
Although digital computers are based 
entirely on computations involving the 
binary digits 0 and 1, more commonly 
known as bits, modern computers do 
most of their work on groups of eight 
bits called bytes. A byte can represent the 
sequences 00000000, 00000001, 00000010, 
through 11111111, which corresponds 
to the decimal numbers 0 through 255 
Figure 1. West Virginia State Police Digital Forensics Unit. http://www.dailymail.com/
News/201108080884
Craig Cunningham
There’s still a lot of research to do!
Summer 2013: Analysis of XOR obfuscation in the wild 
• 4 interns: 1 Poolesville MD High School student (first author) & 3 West Point cadets 
!
Ecological Studies: 
—Better understanding of what happens inside SQLite3 database files. 
—Improved exploitation of RFC822/2822 “headers” in Email, Web Servers, etc. 
!
Identity analytics and disambiguation 
• Identify shared accounts or when an email address passes between users. 
• Identification of paired (work, home) accounts. 
!
“Big data” and data mining 
• Cross-country synchronization of multiple 1PB data sets. 
—Addressing undetectable read/write errors and silent corruption. 
• Identify hostile insiders with outlier analysis 
!
Visualization and Data Fusion: 
• Present complex results in simple, straightforward reports. 
• Combine stored data, network data, and Internet-based information.
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Contact Information: 
Simson L. Garfinkel 
slgarfin@nps.edu 
http://simson.net/ 
http://digitalcorpora.org/
